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The Second Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional
Interpretation
Akhil ReedAmar*
The Rocky Mountain West is gun country in popular folklore and probably
also in fact. Reliable numbers are hard to come by, but in one recent survey
estimating the percentage of households with handguns, the Mountain states
ranked well above the national average-and this in a nation with one of the
highest per capita gun ownership rates in the world.' Earlier this year, the
National Rifle Association (NRA) announced that it would hold its 2007 annual
convention here in Salt Lake City, in part to reward Utah's gun-friendly laws and
lawmakers.2 I suspect that a high percentage ofUtahns could recite the Second
Amendment by heart.
Or at least part ofthe Second Amendment-and there's the rub. Many gun
fans stress the Amendment's "right of the people to keep and bear Arms"
languagewhile slighting otherwords in the Amendment, such as "well regulated"
and "Militia." Even the phrase "bear Arms" and the words "the people" did not
quite mean the same thing to the Founders as they do to today's NRA. To
understand the Second Amendment, we must widen our interpretive field of
vision. For starters, we must see the Amendment as a syntactical whole, and note
the distinctive grammatical linkage between its opening ode and its closing
command. But even this is far too narrow a lens. We must consider the
Amendment alongside its companion amendments-the First and Third in
particular and the Bill ofRights more generally. For example, we must see how
the Second Amendment resembles the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments,
and even the Tenth Amendment. More broadly still, we must read the Second
Amendment alongside similarly worded provisions of state constitutions, and
against the backdrop ofearlier English charters ofliberty such as the English Bill
ofRights of 1689. Perhaps most important, we must confront later constitutional
'Southmayd Professor ofLaw, Yale Law School. This essay derives from the Leary Lecture
delivered at the University of Utah College of Law on October 25,2001. Some portions of the
Lecture first appeared in an article originally published in THENEWREpUBUC, July 12,1999 and
reprinted in 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (2001).
I would like to dedicate this Leary Lecture to my boyhood scoutmaster and friend, Mr. Ken
Harmon ofBoise, Idaho, with thanks for all that he taught me about guns, and about life. My thanks
also to Michael McConnell for all his hospitality and generosity.
·Conversation with criminologist Gary Kleck, Aug. 2, 2001 (summarizing data that, in the
mountain West, about 28.6% ofhouseholds have handguns, compared to a national rate of22.7%;
overall gun possession rates are estimated at 43.7% in the Mountain West and 41.8% nationally).
2See Dawn House, Gun-Friendly Utah is NRA Hostfor 2007, SALT LAKE TRm., May 17,
2001, at C1.
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amendments, such as the Fourteenth and even the Nineteenth Amendment, and
consider how these later texts place the earlier one in a different light.
The results ofthis holistic study may surprise folks on both sides ofthe aisle.
Contrary to NRA ideology, the Founders' SecondAmendment, by itself, provides
only slender support for a robust individual right to own all manner ofguns. Later
constitutional developments-in particular, the words and deeds of the
Fourteenth Amendment-do in fact, when read in conjunction with the Second
Amendment, support an individual right to have a gun in one's home for se1f-
protection; but later developments also support other readings of the Second
Amendment on topics far removed from the gun control debate. For example,
when read in the light of our entire constitutional structure, including post-
Founding amendments, the Second Amendment has some rather remarkable
implications for issues such as women in combat and gays in the military. And
so, to both conservatives who now love the Second Amendment and liberals who
now loathe it, I say, think again: the Amendment may not quite mean what you
thought.
In short, I seek to provoke second thoughts about the Second Amendment
by reading it in a broader constitutional context. I shall begin by sketching out my
substantive reading of the Amendment, and shall conclude with some thoughts
on general issues of interpretive method raised by my reading.
1. READING THE CONSTITUTION: SUBSTANCE
So what does the Second Amendment mean? A lot, says the NRA. Not
much, say gun-control groups. Until recently, it didn't much matter who was
right. On all but the mildest ofmeasures, the NRA had the votes (and the cash),
and that was that. Then came the tragedy at Columbine, here in the Mountain
West. Now proposals for serious federal gun controls are in the air, though not
quite on the congressional floor. Someproposals aim to limit the amount and type
ofammunition that may be purchased; others seek to restrict the number ofguns
a person can buy in a given week; and still others would require licensing all new
guns (and perhaps old ones as well?) on the model ofautomobile licensing, with
gun owners obliged to pass both a written gun safety test and a practical safety
and competence exam. If adopted, would such measures violate the Federal
Constitution?
Let's begin with the words of the Amendment itself: "A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security ofa free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." This curious syntax has perplexed
most modem readers: How do the two main clauses with different subject-nouns
fit together? Do these words guarantee a right ofmilitias, as the first clause seems
to suggest, or a right ofpeople, as the second clause seems to say? In one comer,
gun controllers embrace a narrow, statist reading, insisting that the Amendment
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merely confers arighton state governments to establishprofessional statemilitias
like the National Guard. On this view, no ordinary citizen is covered by the
Amendment. In the other comer, gun groups read the Amendment in a broad,
libertarian way, arguing that it protects a right of every individual to have guns
for self-protection, for hunting, and even for sport. Virtuallynothing having to do
with personal weaponry is outside the Amendment on this view. Both readings
are wrong.
The statist reading sidesteps the obvious fact that the Amendment's actual
command language-"shall not be infringed"-appears in its second clause,
which speaks of "the people" and not "the States." A quick look at the Tenth
Amendment, which draws a sharp distinction between "the States" and "the
people," makes clear that these two phrases are not identical and that the
Founders knew how to say "States" when they meant states.3 What's more, the
eighteenth-century "Militia" referred to by the fIrst clause was not remotely like
today's National Guard. It encompassed virtually all voters-like today's Swiss
militia-rather than a small group ofpaid, semi-professional volunteers.
But the libertarian reading must contend with textual embarrassments ofits
own. The Amendment speaks of a right of "the people" collectively rather than
of"persons" individually. And it uses a distinctly military phrase: "bear Arms."
A deer hunter or target shooter carries a gun but does not, properly speaking, bear
arms.4 The military connotation was even more obvious in an earlier draft ofthe
Amendment, which contained additional language that "no one religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in
person."s Even in the fInal version, note how the military phrase "bear Arms" is
sandwiched between a clause that talks about the "Militia" and a clause (the
Third Amendment) that regulates the quartering of"soldiers" in times of "war"
and"peace.,,6 Likewise, state constitutions onthe books in 1789 consistentlyused
the phrase "bear Arms" in military contexts and no other.7
By now it should be evident that we need to understand how all the words
of the Amendment fIt together, and how they, in tum, mesh with other words in
the Constitution. The Amendment's syntax seems odd only because modem
3U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people.").
41n Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 161 (1840), the Tennessee Supreme Court
declared that the "bear Arms" phrase had "a military sense, and no other.... A man in the pursuit
ofdeer, elk and buffaloes, might carry his rifle every day, for forty years, and, yet, it would never
be said ofhim, that he had borne arms."
sTHE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, 169-73 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
6U.S. CONST. amend. III ("No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent ofthe Owner, nor in time ofwar, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.").
7See THE COMPLETE BILLOF RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 183-85; AKH1L REED AMAR, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 60-61, 332 n.33 (1998).
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readers persistently misread the words "Militia" and "people," imposing
twentieth-century assumptions on an eighteenth-century text. The key subject-
nouns were simply different ways ofsaying the same thing: at the Founding, the
militia were the people and the people were the militia. Indeed, the earlier draft
ofthe Amendment linked the two clauses with linchpin language speaking of"a
well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people."g This unstylish
linchpin was later pulled out, but the very syntax of the final Amendment as a
whole equates the "Militia" of the first clause with "the people" of the second.
In a sound republic, the "people" and the "militia" are one and the same: those
who vote serve in the military and those who serve in the military vote.
Underlying these words was a certain skepticism about a permanent,
hierarchical standing army that might not truly look like America but could
instead embody a dangerous culture within a culture, a proto-military-industrial
complex threatening republican equality and civilian supremacy. The root idea
is not so much guns per se, nor hunting, nor target shooting. Rather the key idea
concerns the link between democracy and the military: We the People must rule,
and must assure Ourselves that Our military will do Our bidding rather than its
own. According to the Amendment, the best way to guarantee this is to have a
military that represents and embodies Us-the people, the voters, the democratic
rulers of a "free state." Rather than placing full confidence in a standing army
filled with aliens, convicts, vagrants, and mercenaries-who do not truly
represent the electorate, and who may pursue their own agendas-a sound
republic should rely on its own armed citizens-a "militia" of "the people."
Call this the small-r republican reading as opposed to the statist and
libertarian readings that dominate modern discourse. Statists anachronistically
read the "Militia" to mean the government (the paid professional officialdom)
rather than the people (the ordinary citizenry). Equally anachronistically,
libertarians read "the people" to mean atomized private persons, each hunting in
his own private Idaho, rather than the citizenry acting collectively. But, when the
Constitution speaks of "the people" rather than "persons," the collective
connotation is primary. In the Preamble, "We the People ... do ordain and
establish this Constitution" as public citizens meeting together in conventions and
acting in concert, not as private individuals pursuing our respective hobbies. The
only other reference to "the people" in the Philadelphia Constitution of 1787
8THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 170-73. Cf 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 425 (Jonathan Elliot ed., AYER Co., 1987) (1836) (remarks of
George Mason at Virginia Ratifying Convention) ("Who are the militia? They consist now ofthe
whole people ...."); id at 112 (remarks ofFrancis Corbin at Virginia RatifYing Convention) ("Who
are the militia? Are we not militia?"); XVIII Lettersfrom The Federal Farmer in 2 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALISTS 341 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) ("A militia, when properly formed, are in fact
the people themselves.... and include ... all men capable ofbearing arms ...").
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appears a sentence away from the Preamble, and here, too, the meaning is public
and political, not private and individualistic: every two years, "the People"-that
is, the voters-elect the House.9 To see the key distinction another way, recall
that women in 1787 had the rights of"persons" (such as freedom to worship and
protections ofprivacy in their homes) but did not directly participate in the acts
of "the people"-they did not vote in constitutional conventions nor for
Congress, nor were they part of the militia/people at the heart of the Second
Amendment.
The rest ofthe Bill ofRights confirms this republican reading. The core of
the First Amendment's Assembly Clause, which textually abuts the Second
Amendment, is the right of"the people"-in essence, voters-to "assemble" in
constitutional conventions and other political conc1aves. lO Likewise, the core
rights retained and reserved to "the people" in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
were rights ofthe people collectively to govern themselves democratically. II The
Fourth Amendment is trickier: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated ...."12 Here, the collective "people" wording is paired with
more individualistic language of"persons." And these words obviously focus on
the private domain, protecting individuals in their private homes more than in the
public square. Why, then, did the Fourth use the words "the people" at all?
Probablyto highlight the role thatjurors-actingcollectivelyandrepresenting the
electorate-would play in deciding which searches were reasonable and how
much to punish government officials who searched or seized improperly. An
early draft ofJames Madison's amendment protectingjuryrights helps make this
linkage obvious and also resonates with the language ofthe Second Amendment:
"[T]he trial byjury, as one ofthe best securities to the rights ofthe people, ought
to remain inviolate."13 Note the obvious echoes here-"security" (Second
Amendment), "secure" (FourthAmendment), and"securities" (draftamendment);
"shall not be infringed," "shall not be violated," and "ought to remain inviolate";
and, of course, "the right of the people" in all three places.
9U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 ("The House ofRepresentatives shall be composed ofMembers
chosen every second Year by the People ofthe several States ").
IOU.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law abridging .. the right ofthe people
peaceably to assemble ...."). Formore support for my reading ofthe core right implicated here, see
AMAR, supra note 7, at 26-32.
IIu.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution ofcertain rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."); id. amend. X, quoted supra note
3. For more support for my populist reading of these Amendments, see AMAR, supra note 7, at
119-22.
12U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 493-94.
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Ifwe want an image ofthe people's militia at the Founding, we should begin
by envisioning the militia's first cousin, the jury. Whereas the Second Amend-
ment highlights the militia, the Fifth, Sixth, and SeventhAmendments, along with
the Fourth, feature the jury. (The Fifth protects grand juries; the Sixth, criminal
juries; and the Seventh, civil juriesI4). Like the militia, the jury was a local body
countering imperial power-summoned by the government but standing outside
it, representing the people, collectively. Like jury service, militia participation
was both a right and a duty ofqualified voters, who were regularly summoned to
discharge their public obligations. (Nonvoters-women, children, aliens-were
in general excluded from both the jury and the militia.) Like the jury, the militia
was composed ofamateurs arrayed against, and designed to check, permanent and
professional government officials Gudges and prosecutors in the case ofthe jury;
a standing army in the case of the militia). Like the jury, the militia embodied
collective political action rather than private pursuits.
Founding history confirms this. The Framers pictured Minutemen bearing
guns, not Daniel Boone gunning bears. When we turn to state constitutions, we
consistently find arms-bearing and militia clauses intertwined with rules
governing standing armies, troop-quartering, martial law, and civilian
supremacy.15 A similar pattern appears in the famous English Bill of Rights of
1689, where language concerning the right to arms immediately followed
language condemning unauthorized standing armies in peacetime.16 Libertarians
cannot explain this clear pattern that has everything to do with the military and
nothing to do with hunting. Conversely, statists also make a hash of these state
constitutional provisions, many ofwhich use language very similar to the Second
Amendment to affirm rights against state governments.
Keeping the jury-militia analogy in mind, we can see the kernel oftruth in
these competing accounts and also what's missing from each. Statists are right to
see the Amendment as localist and to note that law and government help bring the
militia together. So too with the jury. Twelve private citizens who simply get
together on their own to announce the guilt of a fellow citizen are not a lawful
jury but a lynch mob. Similarly, private citizens who choose to own guns today
are not a well-regulated militia of the people; they are gun clubs. But what the
statist reading misses is when the law summons the citizenry together, these
citizens, in an important sense, act as the people outside of government rather
14See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment ofa Grand Jury ...."); id amend. VI ("In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... an impartial jury of the State and
district.. .."); id amend. VII ("In Suits at common law ... the right oftrial byjury shall be preserved
....").
15See sources cited supra note 7.
16The English Bill of Rights 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2 §§ 5-6 (Eng.).
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than as a professional and permanent government bureaucracy. Just as the
bureaucratic EPA is obviously not a true jury, so too the semi-professional
National Guard is not a general militia. Libertarians rightly recoil at the
authoritarianism oftheir opponents in the debate, but wrongly privatize what is
an inherently collective and political right. It is as ifRoss Perot insisted that the
First Amendment guaranteed him the right to conduct his own poll and, on the
basis of this private poll, proclaimed himselfpresident.
But to see all this is to see what makes the Second Amendment so slippery
today: the legal and social structure on which the Amendmentwas built no longer
exists. The Founders' juries-grand, petit, and civil-are still around today, but
the Founders' militia is not. America is not Switzerland. Voters no longer muster
for militia practice in the town square.
Of course, we are free today to read the Second Amendment more broadly
ifwe choose. Thoughtful legal scholars ofall stripes-from Sanford Levinson on
the Left to Eugene Volokh on the Right17-have reminded us that other
amendments have been read generously; why not the Second? But given that a
broad reading is a policy choice rather than a clear constitutional command, we
are entitled to ask ourselves whether a given broad reading makes good sense as
a matter of principle and practice. And the mere fact that, say, the First
Amendment has been read expansively is not an automatic argument for equal
treatment for the Second. For example, violent felons, even while in prison and
especially after their release, obviously have a First Amendment right to print
their opinions in newspapers. Yet such felons have never had a Second
Amendment right to own guns. Even the NRA accepts this double standard. But
what underlies it? The obvious commonsensical idea is that sticks and stones and
guns in the hands of dangerous felons can indeed hurt others in ways that their
words cannot.
Especially today's guns. At the Founding, single-fire muskets had certain
attractive and democratic properties. A person often had to get close to you to kill
you, and in getting close, he usuallyrenderedhimselfvulnerable to counterattack.
It took time to reload and so one person could not typically mow down dozens in
a few seconds. One person, one gun, one shot was not as perfect a system of
majority rule as one person, one vote, but the side with the most men often won;
and there was a rough proportionality of capacity to kill and be killed. What's
more, madmen were constrained by the strong social network of the well-
17See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L. J. 637 (1989);
Eugene Volokh, Guns and the Constitution, THE WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1999, atA23.
HeinOnline -- 2001 Utah L. Rev. 896 2001
896 UTAH LAW REVIEW [2001: 889
regulated militia. Today, technological and social strictures have loosened,
perhaps rendering madmen more dangerous. 18
Moreover, the Founders acted and wrote in a world where democratic self-
government had never truly existed on a continental scale. Then-conventional
wisdom associated liberty and democracy with localism, and linked geographi-
cally expansive regimes with empire and tyranny. If the framers were slightly
paranoid about the potential evil ofa central Leviathan, they had good reason for
this paranoia in light of their lived experience with the British empire and the
history of the world before 1800. But the last two centuries have shown that the
federal government in general has redeemed the hopes ofits friends more than it
has confirmed the fears ofits enemies. To rail against central tyranny today is to
be considerably more paranoid than were the Founders, given the general track
record ofthe United States since 1787. Put another way, because ballots and the
First Amendment have generally worked to prevent full-blown federal tyranny,
bullets and the Second Amendment need not bear as much weight today as some
pessimists anticipated two centuries ago.
Another point: regardless of the original meaning of the Second Amend-
ment, today's interpreters must read this Amendment in light of later constitu-
tional words and deeds. After the experience ofthe Civil War, the strong localism
of the original Second Amendment seems more problematic. Constitutionally
speaking, the heroes of the Civil War fought for the Union army, not the rebel
militias. In the wake of this war and the Amendments it produced, we need to
rethink the vision of Union armies and state militias in our constitutional order.
Moreover, various post-Founding amendments have dramatically expanded
American suffrage. How might these constitutional redefinitions ofthe electorate
affect our understanding of "the people" and the "Militia" at the heart of the
Second Amendment?
If we seek broad readings of the Amendment faithful to the core values of
the Founding yet attentive to subsequent legal and factual developments, here are
a couple that the NRA hasn't proposed but that are at least as plausible as their
preferred broad readings.
1. Take the "mil" out of the militia. In highly sophisticated scholarship
transcending the typical statist-versus-libertarian debate, Indiana law professor
David Williams has emphasized how the militia bound citizens together in a
common venture. 19 It played an important social function in the community and
ISIt may be countered that the federal government today is also more dangerous, given vast
improvements in military technology. True enough, but for reasons I shall soon elaborate, today's
federal government is also less likely to use this military technology to tyrannize its citizens than
many at the Founding realistically feared.
19See David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism andthe Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second
Amendment, 101 YALEL. J. 551 (1991).
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embodied a democratic culture in which rich and poor citizens from all walks of
life came together as equals-as with thejury. Withoutsome forms ofdemocratic
glue, our culture risks flying apart, especially in today's world of increasing
demographic diversity and specialization oflabor. Thus, a broad modem reading
of the Amendment would call for compulsory or quasi-compulsory national
service, with both military and nonmilitary alternatives like VISTA or the
Civilian Conservation Corps. (Recall that an early version of the Amendment
provided for compulsory military service with an opt-out for conscientious
objectors.2o And note that early militias also performed important nonmilitary
functions like disaster relief.) Instead ofbowling alone, Americans would band
together, building a more solid base of social capital and civic virtue.
2. Create an Army that truly looks like America. At the Founding, a standing
army in peacetime was viewed with dread and seen as The Other-mercenaries,
convicts, vagrants, and aliens, as opposed to ordinary citizens. Today, we view
our professional Armed Forces with pride. These forces represent Us, not Them.
Thus, the Founders' militia has begun to morph into today's Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marine Corps. Given this development, women and gays should play
as equal a role as possible in today's institutions of collective self-defense. The
militia celebratedby the SecondAmendment should reflect the people,just as the
jury should. To put the point another way, the Second Amendment says that
voters shouldbear arms and that arms-bearers should vote: The voting electorate
("the people") and the democratic military ("the Militia") should in republican
principle be one and the same. Since the Nineteenth Amendment has made
women equal voters,21 the Second Amendment demands that they be given equal
status in arms. (Allowing women to buy guns at the local sporting goods store
might make them equal in libertarian gun-toting, but it does not make them equal
in republican arms-bearing; it fails to include them on equal terms in modem
America's militia-substitute.)
And what's true for women may also be true for gay men: the Armed Forces'
discrimination ongrounds ofsexual orientationis, formally speaking, discrimina-
tion "on account ofsex," in tension with this Nineteenth Amendment ideal.22 (If
Leslie has intimate physical relations with John, it is a form ofsex discrimination
to treat Leslie one way if she is a woman and a different way if he is a man.)
Formal sex discriminations can be justified in some cases, but they should be
closely interrogated. For example, separate bathrooms for men and women are,
formally, a kind of sex discrimination, but this arrangement is widely seen as
justified by legitimate privacy concerns. So, too, certain sex-based exclusions in
20See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
2IU.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1 ("The right ofcitizens ofthe United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account ofsex.").
22Id.
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military policy might be justifiable, where these exclusions reflect real physical
differences relevant to modem warfare. However, where exclusions of women
and gays are justified merely by the need to maintain "morale" and "unit
cohesion," we should be wary: similar arguments were once used to maintain
racial discrimination in our Armed Forces.23
But is there nothing to be said for the strong libertarian view of guns put
forth by the NRA? ill fact, there is a great deal to be said on behalf of an
individual right to keep a gun in one's home for self-defense, as even Harvard
Law School's Laurence Tribe-no pawn of the NRA-has publicly acknowl-
edged oflate.24 But the best constitutional arguments for this view come not from
the Founding but from the Reconstruction some fourscore years later.
Even with regard to the Founding, it's simplistic to deny any link between
collective security and individual self-defense. Lawyer and legal scholar Don
Kates reminds us that somewhat like standing armies, roving bands ofthugs and
pirates posed a threat to law-abiding citizens, and trusty weapons in private
homes were indeed part of a system of community policing against predators.25
(Note that the Amendment encompasses the right to "keep" as well as "bear"
arms.) But this was not the main image of the Second Amendment at the
Founding. Rather, the Amendmentwas about Lexington and Concord and Bunker
Hill. When arms were outlawed, only the king's men would have arms.
The amendments forged in the afterglow ofthe Revolution reflected obvious
anxiety about a standing army controlled by the new imperial government, and
affection for the good old militia. But things looked different to Americans after
a bloody civil war. Massachusetts militiamen had once died for liberty at Bunker
Hill, but more recently Mississippi militiamen had killed for slavery at
Vicksburg. The imperial Redcoats at the Founding were villains, but the boys in
blue who had won under Grant and Sherman were heroes-at least in the eyes of
Reconstruction Republicans. Thus, when this great generation took its tum
rewriting the Constitution, it significantly recast the right to weapons. Textually,
the Fourteenth Amendment proclaimed the need to protect fundamental
"privileges" and "immunities" ofcitizens.26 Although the Supreme Court ignored
23See Kenneth L. Karst, The PursuitofManhood and the Desegregation ofthe ArmedForces,
38 UCLAL. REv. 499 (1991).
24See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-11 at 900-03 (3d ed.
1999).
2;See Don B. Kates, Jr., The SecondAmendment andtheIdeology ofSelf-Protection, 9 CaNST.
COMMENT 87 (1992). For a powerful presentation ofKates's overall vision, see Don B. Kates, Jr.,
Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning ofthe Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204
(1983).
26U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
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this language for almost a century, there are recent signs that suggest the Justices
may be willing to give this clause a second look.27
If they do, gun groups would have reason to cheer. As scholars such as
StephenHalbrook, MichaelKent Curtis, Robert Cottrol, andRayDiamond28 have
documented in great detail, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment strongly
believed in an individual right to own and keep guns in one's home for self-
protection. Most obviously, blacks and Unionists down South could not always
count on the local police to keep white night-riders at bay. When guns were
outlawed, onlyKlansmen would have gunS.29 Thus, the Reconstruction Congress
made quite clear that a right to keep a gun at home for self-protection was indeed
a constitutional right-a true "privilege" or "immunity" of citizens.
Many speeches to this effect may be found in the 1866 floor debates, but the
most dramatic evidence comes not from individual congressmen, but from
Congress itself. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment was importantly
linked to (though it also went farther than) the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The
companion statute to the Civil Rights Act, the Freedmen's Bureau Bill of 1866,
provided that"personal liberty, personal security, andthe acquisition, enjoyment,
and disposition ofestate, real and personal, including the constitutional right to
bear arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by all the citizens.,,3o This language
made clear that a personal right to firearms was among the privileges and
immunities ofcitizens, according to the Reconstruction Congress that drafted the
Fourteenth Amendment. Nor was this a view unique to Reconstruction Republi-
cans. A decade earlier, ChiefJustice Taney's lead opinion in the DredScott case
had proclaimed that ifblacks ever became citizens, it would necessarily follow
that they would enjoy all the "privileges and immunities of citizens" including
"full liberty of speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon which [a
state's] citizens might speak; [liberty] to hold public meetings upon political
affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went.,,3l Ofcourse, for Taney
citizens ofthe United States ...."). The Amendment explicitly limited state governments, but its
authors made clear that no government, state or federal, had authority to violate fundamental rights
ofcitizens. See AMAR, supra note 7, at 281-83; infra text accompanying note 57-59.
27See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501-11 (1999), (relying squarely on clause to invalidate
a state statute).
28SeeSTEPHENP.HALBROOK,THATEVERYMANBEARMED(1984);STEPHENP.HALBROOK,
FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RiGHT TO BEAR ARMs, 1866-1876 (1998);
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE (1986); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T.
Diamond, The SecondAmendment: TowardanAfro-AmericanistReconsideration, 80 GEO.L.J. 309
(1991). See also L. A. Powe Jr., Guns, Words, and ConstitutionalInterpretation, 38 WM. & MARy
L. REv. 1311 (1997).
290fcourse, I am here using the word "Klansmen" generically, to refer to all sorts ofwhite
terrorists and thugs who emerged in the aftermath ofthe Civil War.
30Freedmen's Bureau Bill, ch. 200 § 14, 14 Stat. 173, 176 (1866) (emphasis added).
31Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 416-17 (1857).
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and company, this meantthat blacks, even iffree, could never be deemed citizens.
The Reconstruction Congress obviously disagreed, and said so in the first
sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, affirming the citizenship of all
persons-black and white, male and female, rich and poor-born in America.32
But Reconstruction Republicans agreed with Taney on what citizenship implied:
a right to have a gun for self defense.
In contrast to the image ofarms at the Founding-a right ofthe people as a
collectivity to organize themselves militarily-both Dred Scott and the Freed-
men's Bureau Bill tended to privatize and demilitarize the image of gun-toting,
the former by speaking of an individual's right to "carry arms" rather than "bear
arms," and the latter with its repeated use of the word "personal" in contrast to
the Founders' collectivist "people."
Thus the Reconstruction Amendment, when read in the light of its history,
does support an individual right to have a gun in one's home for self-protection.
Yet today's NRA tends to stress the Second Amendment far more than the
Fourteenth. This is ironic indeed. The NRA itselfwas born after the Civil War,
sired by a group of ex-Union officers; its swaddling clothes come from the
Reconstruction more than the Founding, as does its individual rights ideology.33
Ifmodem courts were to take the Reconstruction vision seriously, state and
local governments would be limited along with federal officials; in legal jargon,
the Second Amendment right to arms would be "incorporated" against the
states.34 That's the good news for the NRA. But the bad news, at least for the
most ardent gun lovers, is that whatever Fourteenth Amendment right exists is a
limited one. Virtually no one today is seriously arguing to take away all guns
from homes. And actually trying to do so would be a nightmare for anyone who
cares about liberty and privacy, given that guns are stashed everywhere and come
close to outnumbering people in America. (Once again, it is useful to look beyond
the Second Amendment itself, to ponder the Fourth Amendment implications of
any widespread confiscation program.) Instead, most proposals seek to regulate
32U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § I ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
·d ")reSl e.... .
33SeeNATIONALRIFLEASSOCIATION OFAMERICA,AMERICANS AND THEIR GUNS 31-35 (James
E. Serven ed., 1967).
34Thus far, the Second Amendment is one of the few parts of the Bill of Rights that the
Supreme Court has not held to be incorporated against state and local governments. Indeed, the
Court has said very little about the Amendment in the last sixty years-the period in which
incorporation of most other provisions of the Bill of Rights took place. For strong historical
arguments in favor ofincorporation, see the sources cited supra note 28. Recently, one Justice has
openly hinted that the Supreme Court might do well to revisit the question of the Second
Amendment's meaning. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,937-39 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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rather than prohibit-for example, limiting the amount and type of guns and
ammo one can buy. Requiring registration of guns and even licenses with
practical and book tests, on the model oflicensing drivers, sends some gun lovers
up the wall-the first step toward confiscation, they predict in dire tones. But this
is hard to take seriously. The authors of the Second Amendment, after all, were
perfectly comfortable knowing that the government would know who had
weapons-everyvoter-andalso wereperfectlycomfortable requiring those who
owned guns to be properly trained and monitored in their use: training and
monitoring were at the heart ofmilitia musters. Reasonable gun control laws of
the sort I have mentioned may not be exactly what the Framers had in mind when
they said that the armed citizenry should be "well regulated." But-at least in a
world that is so distant from the Founders-they are close enough.
ll. READING THE CONSTITUTION: METHOD
I hope I have said enough to give you a sense ofmy constitutional take on
substantive topics such as gun control and American military policy. In the time
I have left, I propose to offer a few words about my constitutional method-about
the interpretive tools I have used today and elsewhere, the interpretive moves I
have made in my claims about the Second Amendment and the rest of the
Constitution.
Proper constitutional interpretation begins with the text ofthe Constitution
itself. Textual interpretation, however, can be done well orbadly, and even when
done well is only the first step ofanalysis. As James Madison, writing as Publius,
reminded his audience in The Federalist No. 37, the natural and social universe
is often blurry, lacking clean joints; and language itself introduces further
complexities. Words sometimes have relatively clear core meanings but then
shade offgradually when we move away from the core. In law, we often seek the
meaning ofa phrase or an entire sentence, in which the legal whole may be more
or less than the sum of the linguistic parts, especially when we deal with legal
terms of art and metaphors more generally. Consider, for example, the Fifth
Amendment command that "[n]o person shall ... be subject for the same offence
to be twice put injeopardy oflife or limb."35 Should the words "life or limb" here
be read literally, allowing the government to try me again after I have been
acquitted in a fair trial so long as the punishment at issue is neither death nor
dismemberment? (Suppose the government merely seeks to imprison me for
twenty years and subject me to monthly floggings.) Here, it seems clear that the
"life or limb" phrase is best read as a poetic pairing, a graphic synecdoche for all
serious criminal punishment.
3SU.S. CONST. amend V.
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The Second Amendment presents a similar challenge: though the word
"bear" is roughly synonymous with "carry" and the word "Arms" encompasses
"guns," there is, I have argued, a subtle difference between the phrase "bear
Arms" and the words "carry guns"-especially when the "bear Arms" phrase is
surrounded by other military language. My claim is not that no one at the
Founding ever used the phrase "bear Arms" to encompass, say, hunting. In fact,
we can find such uses36-but they are rare, the proverbial linguistic exceptions
that prove the rule and illustrate the elasticity and metaphoric nature oflanguage
generally.
Further complications arise as language evolves. Today, the phrase "bear
Arms" has for many Americans lost its overwhelmingly militarymeaning and has
become more synonymous with gun-toting in genera1.37 But good textual
interpretation of the Constitution should generally seek to read the text as it was
understood by the people who framed and ratified the language in question, or
who reglossed it when adopting a later amendment. When real people have lived
through real evils and carefully crafted language to prohibit these evils from
recurring-"Never again!"-theirposterity would be wise to read their language
in light of the historical mischief they aimed to banish. This is the insight ofmy
colleague Jed Rubenfeld, who urges modem readers to attend to the "paradigm
case"-the core historical evil-underlying many a constitutional prohibition.38
In reminding you ofthe evils ofan imperial standing army in the late 1700s, and
conjuring up images of Lexington and Concord and Bunker Hill, I have tried to
be faithful to this mode of textual and historical interpretation.
36See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 7, at 47, 262 (quoting amendment proposed by some
Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists affirming a right of the people to "bear arms for the defence of
themselves and their own State, or the United States, or for the purpose ofkilling game ...")
(emphasis added).
In an opinion handed down days before this lecture, a Fifth Circuit panel claimed to have
found "numerous instances" of early usage "indisputably" supporting a nonmilitary, libertarian
reading of arms-bearing. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203,230 n.29 (5th Cir. 2001).
Most ofthe cited sources postdate the Constitution by decades. Ofthe remaining material cited, only
one source in fact clearly supports a nonmilitary libertarian reading as opposed to what I have called
the republican reading ofthe "bear Arms" phrase. That one source is above-quoted language from
some Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists.
37A great many modem state constitutions use the "bear Arms" phrase outside a strictly
military and collective context. A significant number of states-including Delaware, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin-explicitly link the "bear
Arms" phrase to hunting and/or recreation. These state constitutional references to hunting and
recreation appear to be ofa distinctly recent vintage, enacted in the 1980s and 1990s. For a recent
catalogue ofstate constitutional provisions, see David B. Kopel et al.,A Tale ofThree Cities: The
Right to Bear Arms in State Supreme Courts, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1I77, 1I8D-83 n.13 (1995). See
also WIS. CONST. art. I, § 25 (adopted 1998).
38JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
178-95 (2001).
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A different approach, which sought only the modem meanings of words,
would risk constitutional commandbypun. Ifa public school prohibited students
from wearing tank tops, surely nothing should tum on whether some clever
plaintiffcharacterizes this dress code as infringing his right to "bare arms." (This
would remain true even ifsome trendy back-to-phonics movementhad somehow
succeeded in convincing most ordinary Americans to spell "bear" and "bare" the
same way: bAr.)
In seeking out the core meaning of a constitutional prohibition and the
historical paradigm case that prompted the prohibition, good textualists have
many tools at hand.
I have highlighted the significance oflanguage quite similar to the Second
Amendment's in antecedent state constitutions, and in other landmark texts such
as the English Bill of Rights. The historical and linguistic links between these
documents and the Second Amendment are relatively clear. Others have
suggested that the Founders' Second Amendment borrowed from Blackstone's
account ofthe right to have arms for individual self-defense;39 but these scholars
have not shown any tight linguistic linkage between the Second Amendment's
phraseology and Blackstone's or any specific historical evidence suggesting that
the Founders had Blackstone primarily in mind here. Elsewhere, I have presented
evidence that Blackstone's view of arms was much more influential for the
Reconstruction generation than for the Founders.40 Those who lived through
Lexington andBunkerHill didnotneedorwantBlackstone-anEnglishmanwho
had opposed the American Revolution-to explain to them the core meaning of
militias and the people's right to arms. Unlike Blackstone, the Founding
generationhighlighted the political and populistnature ofcollective arms bearing
rather than its individualistic dimension: the Second Amendment was a military
provision focused on collective security rather than individual self defense.
Here is where the words of adjoining clauses-the opening ode to the
militia, and the neighboring Third Amendment-seem decisive, especially when
read against the general backdrop of the American Revolution itself. Attention
to contiguous clauses in the Constitution is an interpretive technique that one
[mds on prominent display in classic Marshall Court opinions authored by
Marshall himselfand his towering colleague Joseph Story.41 Another technique
visible in these opinions is whatIhave recentlycalled"intratextualism"-reading
a constitutional word or phrase in light ofother uses ofthat phrase elsewhere in
39See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right, 104 YALE
L.J. 995 (1994) (reviewing JOYCE LEE MALcOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMs: THE ORIGINS OF AN
ANGLO AMERICAN RIGHT (1994)).
40See AMAR, supra note 7, at 226 n*, 261-66.
41Cj. McCullochv. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 419 (1819); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328-29, 332-34 (1816).
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the document.42 In this tradition, I have today emphasized that the words "the
people" in the Second Amendment should be read alongside the use of these
words in the Preamble and Article I, and their later appearance in the First, Ninth
and TenthAmendments. And I have also explained how the Fourth Amendment's
usage is more complicated because it features the word "person" alongside the
more collective-sounding "the people."
A skeptic might wonder if I am simply fabricating a linguistic distinction
without a difference: aren't "the people" just individual "persons" added up, one
by one? No. For starters, some "persons" are not within the core meaning of"the
people" as the Constitution uses the term. As a general matter, aliens were not
part ofthose who ordained the Constitution, or voted in congressional elections,
or served on juries or militias.43 So too with women (prior to the Nineteenth
Amendment) and children. What's more, the phrase "the people" suggests an
interactivity among persons whereby the whole group is more than simply the
parts added together one by one. A militia has an interactive social structure, as
does ajury, and (ideally) an electorate. A world in which everyone has a gun for
sport but never musters with others is not a true militia: these gun owners are
acting as private persons, not a collective people.44
Intratextual analysis is also useful in understanding the people's Second
Amendment counterpart: the "Militia." Several provisions ofArticle I, section 8
address the militia,45 and a complete analysis of the Second Amendment should
explain how its words mesh with, and gloss, those earlier provisions. Elsewhere,
I have tried to do just this, explaining the important social and legal differences
at the Founding between localist militias of ordinary citizens and a paid,
professional centralized standing army.46 And all this strongly confirms that atthe
Founding, the Second was primarily a military amendment. Contrary to
libertarian ideology and the NRA credo, neither hunting nor individual self-
defense lay at the core of the Founders' Second Amendment.
None of this means that individual self-defense cannot be recognized as a
constitutional right. Not all constitutional rights are strictly textual, and even texts
42See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L. REv. 747 (1999).
43Senate rules circa 1866 apparently did not allow foreigners to petition that body, on the
theory that petition was a right of"the people." See AMAR, supra note 7, at 174,364 n.41.
«See generally Williams, supra note 19.
4SSee U.s. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 15-16:
[Congress shall have Power] To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of
the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part
of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States
respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.
46See AMAR, supra note 7, at 50-59.
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may often be properly read as radiating beyond their core command. If "life or
limb" can be read poetically and metaphorically beyond the literalistic core of
death and dismemberment, so in theory can the words "bear Arms," especially if
we stress the additional word "keep." The question thus becomes, what reasons
do we have for reading the words broadly, beyond the core case?
The Ninth Amendment is suggestive here: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, ofcertain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people."47 Thus, the mere fact that a given right is not explicitly
enumerated-not textually specified-should not lead us automatically to
conclude that the right does not exist; rights may exist even if textually
unspecified. But the Ninth is better at telling us what not to do than at providing
detailed guidance about where, how, and why to find nontextual rights.
Here, then, are a few thoughts of my own on the much mooted topic of
unenumerated rights. Even though the text may not enumerate a right, it might
nonetheless imply it. For example, although the Constitution's text does not quite
enumerate it, surely a defendant has the right to confront physical evidence
introduced against him and the right to introduce reliable physical evidence in his
favor-by subpoena if necessary. These unenumerated rights follow a fortiori
from his enumeratedrights to confront opposingwitnesses and subpoena his own
witnesses; and are also implicit in due process, even ifnot explicitly and minutely
specified (that is, enumerated).48 As another example, considerwhether Congress
may punish the author of a handwritten political tract criticizing federal policy.
Strictly speaking, the tract is neither oral "speech" nor the product of a printing
"press." Yet surely, the enumerated rights of "speech" and "press,,49-and the
broader structural logic of the Constitution's scheme of republican self-
government-imply that this nonenumerated form of political expression must
likewise be a right retained by members of the self-governing citizenry.
Sometimes, we should read a textual right more broadly than its core
commandmight demand because these extra applications ofthe right can provide
a buffer zone protecting the core. Buffer zones are especially apt if, in applica-
47U.S. CaNST. amend VIII.
48See U.S. CaNST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to be confronted with the witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsoryprocess for obtaining
witnesses in his favor ...."); id. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived oflife, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ...."). For more detailed analysis of the interactions and
implications oftheseprovisions fornonspecified rights, seeAKHILREEDAMAR, THE CONSTITUTION
AND CRIMINALPROCEDURE: FIRSTPRlNCIPLES 94-96, 132 (1997); AkhilReedAmar, Constitutional
Redundancies and Clarifying Clauses, 33 VAL. U. L. REv. 1, 18-20 (1998).
49U.S. CaNST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no lawrespecting an establishmentofreligion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom ofspeech, or ofthe press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.").
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tion, it is hard to demarcate crisply the outer boundaries of a given enumerated
right. Consider once again the First Amendment.50 The core idea underlying the
Founders' Freedom of Speech Clause was a right to engage in political
expression, especially anti-government speech. Intratextual and historical analysis
confirms that this was the core idea: the phrase "freedom ofspeech" derives from
the English Bill of Rights protecting "freedom of speech, and debates ... in
parliament.,,51 "Parliament"-from the French ''parler,'' to speak-is a parley
place, a speaking spot. But Parliament is not quite a spot for any and all
utterances: the core concept here is political expression. So too, our Constitu-
tion's Article I, section 6 protects congressional freedom of "Speech [and]
Debate,"52 and state constitutions circa 1789 likewiseprotected legislative speech
and debate. In all these contexts, it is clear that the key concern is political
expression. Moreover, the First Amendment phrase "Congress shall make no
law" suggests that Congress simply lacked enumerated power to regulate speech.
This phrase confirms that the Founders were thinking ofpolitical speech, rather
than, say, commercial advertising or commercial contracting, both ofwhich are
also done with words, but with words that do fall within Congress's enumerated
power to regulate interstate commerce.53 It thus makes sense to say that political
speech is the core right in the First Amendment, and that commercial speech is
not.
In today's world, however, it may not be possible to sharply distinguish
between the two in all contexts. Is a newspaper ad only commercial speech? Even
if it criticizes government policy? This is no mere law professor hypothetical: it
is the basic set offacts underlying New York Times v. Sullivan, 54 perhaps the most
important First Amendment case of the modern era. Given the difficulty of
sharply distinguishing between political and commercial speech in some
situations, a strict regime in which commercial speech got no protection at all
might threaten our core right; we might be better offwith a kind ofsliding scale
approach protecting some commercial speech in order to buffer the core right of
political expression.
Similarly, even if the core right of "the people" to assemble in the First
Amendment focused on political conclaves ofvoters-eonstitutional conventions
and the like-we might have sound structural reasons to read the amendment
50For more documentation of my claims today about the First Amendment, see generally
AMAR, supra note 7, at 24-25,36-42; Akhil Reed Amar, Some Notes on the Establishment Clause,
2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. I (1996).
51English Bill ofRights, 1689, 1 W. & M., c.2, § 9 (Eng.).
52U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 ("[A]nd for any Speech or Debate in either House, they
[Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.").
S3See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3 ("[Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
54376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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beyond this core, protecting even nonvoters' rights to get together for a variety
ofnoncommercial and expressive purposes-prayer, fellowship, parades, and so
on. Such a broad right would cohere with other rights affIrmed by the "First
Amendment-freedom ofreligion, for example-and this broad right also draws
historical support from the Reconstruction Amendment, which reflected a strong
commitment to the associational rights even of nonvoters (paradigmatically,
blacks and women).55
Now let's return to the Second Amendment, and ask whether there are
comparably good reasons to read the "bear Arms" right broadly, outside its
original core meaning. Given that the militia no longer exists as a genuine
institutional reality, an individual right serves little purpose as a buffer zone
around the core. (The core has melted away.) Nor is an individual right strongly
presupposed by the very logic of a collective militia. Nor do general structural
arguments onbehalfofexpressive organizations and intermediate associations in
a working democracy-arguments that counsel broad readings of the First
Amendment-apply to a broad libertarian reading ofthe Second Amendment.
History, however, does provide some support for a broad libertarian reading
of the right to "keep and bear Arms," but the best historical argument for
libertarians comes not from the Founding but from Reconstruction. The
Fourteenth Amendment's framers emphatically proclaimed their intent to make
the Bill of Rights applicable against states.56 In effect, they readopted the Bill,
glossing it with their own understandings. Although the Founders fused together
arms-bearing with militias, the Reconstruction statute that I have quoted drove a
wedge between the two, severing the idea of individual gun ownership for self
protection from militia service. Concretely: the Fourteenth Amendment affIrmed
the civil right of black men-and of black women and white women, for that
matter-to have a gun for selfprotection even though these persons did not (yet)
enjoy the distinct political right to be part ofthe militia.
If this seems to you like overly clever time travel-reading the 1789 "bear
Arms" phrase in light of 1868 understandings that reglossed that phrase in the
course of formally rewriting the Constitution-an even simpler textual and
historical argument for an individual right is as follows: Put the Second
Amendment aside. The Fourteenth Amendment itselfsays that "[n]o State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens ofthe United States." The Amendment also presupposes that the federal
government may not interfere with these privileges and immunities either-they
inhere in American citizenship itselfand are protected from federal abridgement
by the Amendment's fIrst sentence declaring national birthright citizenship.57
55See AMAR, supra note 7, at 241-46.
56Id. at 137-294, and sources cited therein.
57See supra note 26. See generally AMAR, supra note 7, at 281-83.
HeinOnline -- 2001 Utah L. Rev. 908 2001
908 UTAH LAW REVIEW [2001: 889
(The Amendment's second sentence proceeded to make explicit that states could
not violate these rights of citizenship because an 1833 Supreme Court case,
Barron v. Baltimore,58 had seemed to insist on special Simon Says language
where states were concerned.)59 One ofthese privileges and immunities is a right
to have a gun in one's home for self-protection. The precise boundaries of this
right may be blurry and fluid-reasonable regulations are permissible, total
prohibitions more suspect-but it is quintessentially an individual, libertarian
right, as highlighted by the text, logic, and history ofthe Fourteenth Amendment.
The text speaks of a "privilege"-a kind of private right-of "citizens." Black
men, and women ofall races, are indeed citizens covered by this Clause, even if
they don't vote, serve on juries or militias, or wield other political rights. And
given the paradigm evil of Klan-style thuggery in the minds of Reconstruction
Republicans, the right to a gun in one's home was indeed a core component ofthe
original vision of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Yet another Fourteenth Amendment approach might say thatjudges seeking
to identify unenumerated "privileges" and "immunities" deserving federal
constitutional protection should look not merely to Reconstruction history but
also to the American tradition more broadly and to modern state constitutional
law.60 On this approach, it is noteworthy that many state constitutions have been
written and/or construed to protect private gun ownership,61 and that-like it or
not-a gun in one's home for self-protection is deeply rooted in the American
ethos. Of course, on this view as well, the libertarian right would not be an
absolutist one. The American tradition has encompassed many reasonable
regulations ofweapons short oftotal confiscation, and state judges in the modern
era have rarely used state constitutions to strike down moderate gun controls.62
Against this understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment's privileges and
immunities clause, it might be argued that Supreme Court precedent has generally
repudiated reliance on this clause,63 and that it is now too late to go back. But
open reliance on this clause would not overturn Court precedent so much as
recast it, encouraging the Justices to be more candid and careful about what they
have been doing all along under the awkward label of"substantive due process."
More generally, I have tried to argue elsewhere that mistaken precedents alone
do not amend the Constitution, and that the document itself generally invites
5832 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
59Jd. at 247-50.
6°This brand of constitutional traditionalism has been ably expounded by a previous Leary
Lecture, from which I have greatly profited. See Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the
Jurisprudence ofTradition, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 665, 681-701 (1997).
61See supra note 37.
62See Kopel et aI, supra note 37; Steven H. Gunn, A Lawyer's Guide to the Second
Amendment, 1998 BYU L. REv. 35.
63See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74-80 (1873).
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judges to repudiate mistaken interpretations in cases where doing so would not
frustrate legitimate reliance interests.64
My exposition of the Second Amendment today has not dwelt on modem
Supreme Court precedent; there is rather little Second Amendment precedent to
go by, and even that little is murky. The Court has not applied the Amendment
against the states, but has failed to give cogent reasons for treating it differently
from most other provisions of the Bill of Rights, which do now apply against
states. Nor has the Courtmade clear exactlywhat the Amendmentbars the federal
government from doing.65 Under my interpretive framework, perhaps the most
important Supreme Court pronouncement on arms bearing came, ironically
enough, in Dred Scott v. Stanford.66 Even if the Dred Scott Court was wrong in
the 1850s to declare a libertarian right ofgun-toting to be a privilege or immunity
of citizenship,67 We the People were entitled to rely-and did rely-on that
pronouncement when amending the Constitution in the 1860s. Thus Dred Scott
provides strong evidence for deeming individual gun ownership to be a core
privilege of citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
So much for text, history, and precedent. Even after all these have been
considered, our constitutional analysis is still incomplete. Given that the world
of 1789 and the world of 1866 are very different from our own, how are we to
"translate" these old commands into rules and principles that make constitutional
sense today?68 The Founders' militia no longer exists, I have argued. What, then,
are we to make of an amendment built on that rock? The slightly paranoid anti-
central-government ideology underlying the original Second Amendment seems
less justified in the year 2001. Is it permissible to disavow paranoia in applying
the Amendment today? Or is this disavowal simply disagreement with Founding
values that might justify openly amending the Second out of the document but
cannot justify undermining it via hostile "interpretation"? Guns are far more
deadly today-is this relevant?
Myanswers to all these questions travel throughthe FourteenthAmendment.
The very fact of this amendment was publicly predicated on a profoundly un-
Founding-like understanding of the central army and local militias. Bluntly, the
Fourteenth Amendment became law thanks to the Union army, which helped
suppress rebel militias. Indeed, the Reconstruction Act of 1867 provided for
federal military occupation and governance ofthe unreconstructed South, and in
64See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARv. L. REv. 26,
78-89 (2000).
6SSee United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
6660 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
67Id. at 416-17.
68Cj. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx.L. REv. 1165 (1993) (discussing need
to translate old texts to meet new contexts).
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effect told Confederate states that they must ratify the Fourteenth Amendment
(and comply with various other conditions) before they would be allowed to
resume their regular role within the Union.69 Although the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's text did not explicitly rewrite the Founders' elaborate rules about militias
and armies, the simple fact ofthe amendment itself invites a new understanding
in which local militias are no longer the unambiguous heroes, and the Union's
army is no longer the presumedvillain, ofAmerica's epic constitutional narrative.
The American Constitution is an act as well as a text-it is a doing, a constitut-
ing. "We the People ... do ordain and establish ...."70 So too, with amendments,
which are deeds as well as words. And the deed of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment-the brute fact of its enactment and the physical exertions that made that
enactment occur-are part ofthe Constitution itself. To read and follow the text
is necessarily, I think, to accept the general validity of the open exertions that
made the text law. These open exertions, the things publicly done to get various
texts adopted, are unenumerated (that is, nontextual) aspects ofthe Constitution,
but inextricable parts of the Constitution nonetheless.71 On this view, the
Fourteenth Amendment itself-implicitly and nontextually, but openly and
emphatically-modified some of the Founders' military provisions. Thus, the
death of the Founders' militia is not something-like an erroneous prece-
dent-that faithful constitutionalists must seek to undo ifat all possible. (That is
why one possible and legitimate response today to an obviously military Second
Amendment is an interpretation that seeks to "take the 'mil' out ofthe Militia.")
A less paranoid view of the federal government is implicit in the Fourteenth
Amendment itself; it is not merely some extra-constitutional fact about modem
American society. And the increased deadliness ofweaponry may indeed be one
among several relevant considerations as modem judges define the precise
boundaries ofthe unenumerated privilege of gun ownership, or (to put the point
a different way) the Reconstructed right of individuals to "bear Arms" (read
broadly) far outside the bounds of the Founders' militias. The Fourteenth
69Act ofMar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428. For general discussion of this Act, sometimes
referred to as the Military Reconstruction Act, see MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF
PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REpUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1869, at 223-43 (1974);
ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 271-77,
307-08,438 (1988); KENNETHM. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877, at 144-47
(1965). For a briefreference to this Act in the context of interpreting the Second Amendment, see
David Yassky, The SecondAmendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH.
L. REv. 588, 643 (2000). Note also that in the months following the first Reconstruction Act,
Congress adopted additional Reconstruction legislation which sharpened the role of the federal
military in the Union effort to rebuild the South on a sound constitutional footing.
70U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
71The ideas presented in this paragraph may profitably be compared and contrasted with the
fascinating work of my colleague Bruce Ackerman. See I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
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Amendment does not textually specify the precise boundaries of this right, and
today's interpreters may legitimately note important differences between
nineteenth-century firearms on the one hand, and twenty-first century weapons
on the other.
One other modem development deserves mention in the context of
"translating" Founding and Reconstruction visions into twenty-first century
doctrines. The Reconstruction generation embraced private gun ownership
because local police officials in the South could not be trusted to protect blacks.
Ifin some places today this is no longer the case, might private gun ownership be
given less protection? Is the real "privilege" bestunderstood as a gun itself, or the
underlying security from thugs? If the latter, perhaps a better translation of the
Reconstruction vision would seekto ensure that localpolice departments provide
far better protection to minority communities; and a complementary translation
of the Founding vision might demand that today's local militia-substitute-the
localpolice-departmentgenuinelyreflect the demographic diversity ofthe local
community it serves.72 Those wielding guns and enforcing local laws (the
Founders' militia, and today's police departments) should truly be composed of
the body ofthe people (white men at the Founding, all adults today).
This last suggestion-that our police departments should truly look like
America, with blacks alongside whites, men alongside women, and gays
alongside straights-takes us back to my similar claims about America's Armed
Forces. In essence, the Founders' militiahas been replaced by two sets oftwenty-
first century institutions. Locally, law enforcement has shifted to police
departments; nationally, collective military defense is now dominated by a
professional Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. The deepest idea ofthe
Second Amendment, I have argued, is that these collective arms-bearinglgun-
toting entities should reflect the American electorate they are supposed to serve
and protect. And, after the Fifteenth73 and Nineteenth Amendments, that
electoratehas becomemore diverse. Ifsex discrimination and race discrimination
are suspect at the ballot box, they are likewise troubling in the jury room and in
our defense forc~s.
In support of that constitutional vision, I have highlighted the text of the
Second Amendment, but that text is merely the tip ofa constitutional iceberg. In
72My tone is tentative here (and at several other points today) precisely because the many
intervening changes offact and law make it difficult to identifywithperfect confidence the uniquely
best modem interpretation and synthesis ofthe Founding and Reconstruction texts, as opposed to
the range ofpIausible and responsible readings. In part I have chosen the Second Amendment for
exposition today preciselybecause it illustrates many ofthe difficulties that accompany good-faith
efforts at modem constitutional interpretation.
73U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right ofcitizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition ofservitude.").
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the few moments that remain, let me try to outline the underlying iceberg. In the
process, I hope to give you a sense ofwhat is meant by structural interpretation
of the Constitution, reading its various provision as part of a coherent whole
proclaiming and embodying grand themes.
In word and deed, the Constitution's biggest idea is popular sovereignty.
Here, the people rule. In word, We the People ordained the Constitution. In deed,
too. Despite all its exclusions, the ratification ofthe document in the 1780s was
more inclusive than anything that had yet occurred on planet Earth: never before
had so many been allowed to vote on how they and their posterity were to be
governed. Inword, the documentproclaimed that states must feature "republican"
as opposed to aristocratic or monarchical forms of government.74 In deed, the
Fourteenth Amendment embodied and expanded this promise, excluding from
Congress various Southern states that failed to allow large numbers oftheir free
male population (who happened to be black) from voting.75 With later amend-
ments like the Fifteenth and Nineteenth, the grand theme ofdemocracy has been
strengthened and deepened in both word and deed.
In order to rule, the people must retain ultimate control over all institutions
of government. Ideally, the people should participate in all branches of
government. They should directly elect the House of Representatives-the
people's house-every two years. They should participate in executive law
enforcement-at the Founding via militias and posses, today via more profes-
sional organizations ofcommunity defense. The people should also form part of
the judiciary, via the jury. Popular participation is the grand unifying idea
underlying many separate provisions ofthe original Constitution, the Founders'
Bill ofRights, and still later Amendments.
My comments today have tried to highlight links between jury service,
military service, and voting. The Second Amendment's grammar implicitly links
two ofthese; but many other parts ofthe Constitution reinforce the point.76 At the
Founding, various states allowed Patriot militiamen to vote even ifthey failed to
meet ordinary property qualifications. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
defined a state's presumptive electorate in mannerroughly akin to itspresumptive
arms-bearers: male citizens over twenty-one. The Fifteenth Amendment gave
black men the vote ahead of white women in part because these black men had
proved their valor-and helped win the Civil War-on the battlefield of glory.
74U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government.").
75See Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular
Sovereignty, Majority RuleandtheDenominatorProblem, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 749, 778-86 (1994);
Amar, supra note 64, at 49-51.
76For more discussion and documentation ofthe claims in this paragraph, see generally AMAR,
supra note 7, at 48 n.*.
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Woodrow Wilson endorsed the NineteenthAmendment in recognition ofthe role
women were playing on the home front in World War I. The Twenty-Sixth
Amendmene7gave young adults the vote on the theory that those old enough to
fight and die in Vietnam should be allowed to vote on the wisdom of that war,
and all other important matters. (The reverse is also true: ifwomen and gays are
excluded from military equality, their voices might count for less in national
debates about military policy, and they are less likely to win high positions of
political power that have so often gone to those who have served in America's
military.)
In talking about gender issues in the military, I of course am relying on the
Nineteenth Amendment in tandem with the Second. The Nineteenth at its core
protects a right to vote in ordinary elections; but there are sound historical and
structural reasons for reading it broadly beyond its narrow core.78 The Amend-
ment should be understood to protect not just a right to vote, but a right to be
voted for-that is, a right to seek and hold office. It should be read to guarantee
a right to vote in the judicial branch as well as for the legislature-that is, a right
to vote and serve onjuries. And finally, in tandem with the Second, it should be
read to affirm a right to political equality in modem America's militia substitutes.
It is now confession time. I have chosen this venue to proclaim this vision
not merely because the Mountain West is gun country. It is also because this
place has a unique ifunsungrole in the history ofwoman's suffrage. In 1869-70,
the Wyoming Territory embraced women's political equality-encompassing
voting,jury service, and officeholding-andin 1890 Wyoming enteredthe Union
as the first state with full suffrage for women.79 Over the next six years, and long
before any other state followed suit, Colorado, Utah, and Idaho enacted full
woman suffrage.80 By my reckoning, this lecture hall lies remarkably close to the
geographic center ofthese four pathbreaking states. The next state to j oin the full
suffrage club did so in 1910, and by the end of1914 seven sister states hadjoined
the pioneering four. Interestingly enough, these seven-Washington, California,
Oregon, Arizona, Kansas, Nevada, and Montana-likewise form a circle roughly
centered on Salt Lake City.81 And here are a few more facts about neighboring
Wyoming. According to its official state website, Wyoming's current motto is
77U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 ("The rightofcitizens oftheUnited States, who are eighteen
years ofage or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account ofage.").
78Some of these arguments are sketched out in Akhil Reed Amar, Women and the
Constitution, 18 HARv. J. L. PUB. POL'y 465 (1995); for much more elaboration, see Vikram David
Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELLL. REv. 203 (1995).
79AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1890-1920, at 3
(1965) (1971 Anchor reprint).
80See id.
81Id. at 192, 204 n.20.
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"Equal Rights" and one of its three nicknames is the "Equality State" because of
the state's historic leadership on the rights ofwomen "to vote, serve onjuries and
hold public office.,,82 The website goes on to remind visitors that in 1925
Wyoming became the first state to have a woman as governor, Nellie Tayloe
ROSS.83
On the topic ofwomen's rights, then, this region was once way ahead ofits
time. I confess that some of what I have said today about women's rights is
likewise probably ahead of its time. But this seems to me the right place to make
the case. In fact and folklore, the Mountain West may well be Second Amend-
ment country; but let us not forget that it is also home to the Nineteenth
Amendment.
82See State of Wyoming, General Wyoming Information, at
http://www.state.wy.us/state/wyoming_news/general/general.html (last modified Feb. 14,2001);
State of Wyoming, General Facts About Wyoming, at
http://www.state.wy.us/state/wyoming_news/general/history.html (last modified Mar. 23, 1999).
83Id
